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RESPONSE 
Immigration Law, Contracts, and Due Process: 
A Response to Professor Won Kidane’s Review of 
Everyday Law for Immigrants 
Victor C. Romero† 
Professor Won Kidane has done me a great honor by reviewing 
Everyday Law for Immigrants.1 Authors pray their work is not ignored; 
they can only dream that colleagues will take it seriously. From that 
viewpoint, Professor Kidane has blessed me twice. The Seattle Universi-
ty Law Review has also graciously allowed me an opportunity to respond 
to his thoughtful critique. That Professor Kidane found seeds for scholar-
ly discourse within a book intended primarily for nonacademics is a tes-
tament to his comprehensive understanding of U.S. immigration law and 
how it functions on the ground. 
This brief response will focus on two interrelated themes that arise 
out of the “immigration as contract” motif. First, I examine Professor 
Kidane’s claim that current U.S. immigration policy operates more like a 
unilateral or adhesion contract than a bilateral one. Second, I explore the 
notion that due process is at risk when one views immigration policy 
through a contract prism. 
While acknowledging its usefulness as an explanatory frame for lay 
readers, Professor Kidane correctly recognizes that my “immigration as 
contract” analogy lacks nuance. Indeed, Professor Hiroshi Motomura has 
identified at least two other ways of thinking about U.S. immigration 
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policy that find a basis in our history—“immigration as affiliation” and 
“immigration as transition.”2 Nevertheless, Professor Kidane evaluates 
the “immigration as contract” analogy on its own terms and questions 
whether it is an accurate description of U.S. immigration policy. 
Professor Kidane and I agree that U.S. immigration policy—the law 
governing the terms of entry, stay, and expulsion of noncitizens—has a 
contractual flavor to it. Congress, on behalf of the American people, sets 
forth contractual terms. Noncitizens, whether coming as immigrants or 
temporary visitors, must either abide by those terms or leave. 
Delving further, Professor Kidane asks whether the reality of how 
immigration policy operates belies an assumption that the contract was 
bargained for between parties with roughly equivalent power. Invoking 
contract language, Professor Kidane asks whether this immigration con-
tract is truly bilateral, or whether in practice, it operates more like a un-
ilateral adhesion contract with Congress taking advantage of a vulnerable 
group of foreign nationals. Current constitutional jurisprudence supports 
the latter view in the guise of Congress’s plenary power over immigra-
tion policy. 
Because of the plenary power doctrine, the Supreme Court has 
largely ceded power to Congress to fashion what amounts to a one-sided 
contract, imposing upon noncitizens terms that our Constitution would 
not tolerate if applied to U.S. citizens. One need look no further than the 
Chinese Exclusion Act case of Chae Chan Ping v. United States3 or the 
Red Scare narrative behind Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei4 
before concluding that race and political ideology, while no longer per-
missible grounds of discrimination in our post-Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion5 society, remain constitutional bases for exclusion under immigra-
tion law. Citing social psychology research, Dean Kevin Johnson has 
argued that the discrimination against foreign minorities tolerated within 
our immigration law reflects the displacement of U.S. society’s bias, 
whether conscious or unconscious, against citizen minorities.6 
Returning to the “immigration as contract” analogy, Professor Ki-
dane also observes that within contract law, courts may void unfair con-
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tracts, something federal courts rarely do under the plenary power doc-
trine: “[C]ourts often provide a remedy for grossly unfair terms predi-
cated on principles of law and equity, including reasonable expectations, 
undue influence, unconscionability, mistake, and impossibility. None of 
these principles of law or equity apply in immigration law under the ple-
nary power doctrine.”7 Thus, to the extent that the “immigration as con-
tract” analogy holds today, Professor Kidane asserts that this vision of 
contracts represents the now-abandoned laissez-faire approach taken by 
the Lochner Court,8 where it was assumed that bakers had the same bar-
gaining power as their employers,9 where labor unions were unnecessary 
impediments to the freedom to contract,10 and where production mono-
polies were not necessarily threats to interstate commerce.11 
Lest some be tempted to conclude that noncitizens’ rights are al-
ways compromised under the plenary power doctrine, it should be noted 
that both within Congress and within the Court’s plenary power regime, 
there have been occasions for celebration. Even the current Supreme 
Court has stepped in to temper excessively onerous applications of Con-
gress’s immigration contract. 
First, while Congress primarily reflects the interests of U.S. citi-
zens, it also recognizes that national interests often coincide nicely with 
those of noncitizens wishing to immigrate or visit. For instance, our im-
migration laws reflect a desire to facilitate family unification, enhance 
domestic industry through the recruitment of highly skilled foreign labor, 
and protect the most vulnerable through our refugee and asylum laws.12 
While many problem areas still remain—the perennial backlogs, the lack 
of a robust guest-worker program, and the failure to pass comprehensive 
immigration reform, to name but a few—the foundation of our core im-
migration policy demonstrates a celebration of the United States as a na-
tion of immigrants. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that minorities and 
others who believe our immigration laws operate unfairly should lobby 
alongside fellow travelers for legislative change.13 Once secured, such 
immigrant-friendly legislation would be protected by the plenary power 
doctrine from intrusive judicial review. 
                                                 
 7. See Kidane, supra note 1, at 893. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905). 
 10. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 19 (1915). 
 11. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895). 
 12. See, e.g., VICTOR C. ROMERO, EVERYDAY LAW FOR IMMIGRANTS 25–58 (2009) (discuss-
ing family-based, employment-based, and asylum-based forms of immigration under U.S. law). 
 13. See generally Victor C. Romero, On Elián and Aliens: A Political Solution to the Plenary 
Power Problem, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 343 (2001). 
906 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:903 
Second, while the plenary power regime within immigration law 
has seemed a formidable obstacle for immigrant advocates, the Court has 
used its statutory interpretation power to provide due process protections 
to noncitizens in exceptional cases. Aside from the Court curtailing the 
executive’s detention powers in Zadvydas v. Davis14 and Clark v. Marti-
nez,15 we have witnessed during this past term alone immigrant rights 
victories limiting the definition of an aggravated felony16 and abrogating 
the Attorney General’s power to limit discretionary relief.17 Occasional-
ly, the Court has even invoked a specific constitutional provision to pro-
vide a remedy, as it did in Padilla v. Kentucky.18 There, the Court held 
that the failure to inform a noncitizen of the possible deportation conse-
quences of a guilty plea violated the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel.19 So, notwithstanding the plenary power doctrine, 
the Court has sometimes used its power of judicial review to protect non-
citizens from the exceptionally harsh effects of U.S. immigration policy. 
Relatedly, many remember the Lochner era as an antiquated, by-
gone20 period of judicial deference to market forces that perpetuated ex-
isting inequalities between the employer and the employed; but, even 
within that framework, the Court occasionally recognized the need to 
protect particularly vulnerable groups of workers. In Holden v. Hardy, 
for instance, the Court upheld a Utah law limiting the hours of mine 
workers, recognizing the danger inherent in such labor.21 And in Muller 
v. Oregon, the Court limited the working hours of women in factories 
and laundries.22 While we may question the wisdom of distinguishing 
bakers’ work from that of miners’, or stereotyping women as inherently 
unsuited to work outside the home, the Supreme Court—even during the 
Lochner era—safeguarded its duty as the final arbiter of the Constitution 
under Marbury v. Madison23 by reviewing the workings of state and fed-
eral legislatures to ensure the validity of their policies. Similarly, even 
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within the Court’s plenary power framework, immigration laws are often 
subject to statutory and constitutional review by the federal courts. 
All this is not to say there are no distinctions in the way the United 
States government treats immigrants and citizens. I fully agree with Pro-
fessor Kidane’s description of the stark differences in how immigration 
courts administer “due process”—by not mandating counsel, audio-
taping proceedings instead of having court reporters, allowing judges to 
ask questions of the noncitizen, having some hearings in absentia—when 
compared with, for instance, criminal proceedings.24 Yet, given the con-
sequences that attend deportation, especially when the noncitizen faces 
the prospect of persecution abroad,25 one might suspect more robust due 
process protections apply in removal proceedings. 
Furthermore, there is the problem of public perception. Oftentimes, 
the public will mistake an immigration law violation for a criminal law 
one, especially where the undocumented are concerned.26 For instance, 
crossing a border is a morally neutral act with no legal significance ex-
cept that which our society attaches to it. And yet, because our immigra-
tion laws treat unauthorized border crossers as federal criminals,27 the 
public frequently does so as well, rather than viewing their act as no 
more morally repugnant than jaywalking. Indeed, one might argue that 
border crossers often have better moral reasons than jaywalkers to justify 
their actions. As President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s immigration chief 
Daniel MacCormack once testified before Congress, “[T]he mother who 
braces the hardship and danger frequently involved in an illegal entry for 
purpose of rejoining her children cannot be held by that sole act to be a 
person of bad character.”28 
In sum, I agree with Professor Kidane that much of how our immi-
gration law has functioned smacks of a unilateral adhesion contract that 
places noncitizens at the mercy of a xenophobic federal Legislature, an 
aggressive Executive, and a reluctant Judiciary Branch bound by accu-
mulated plenary power precedent. Nonetheless, I remain cautiously op-
timistic. The advocate in me believes that, even from an “immigration as 
contract” perspective, there are ways to achieve a fairer balance between 
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national interests and immigrant rights, whether it is through the promo-
tion of immigrant-friendly legislation that would then enjoy protection 
under the plenary power doctrine, or through challenging the most egre-
gious applications of existing immigration laws, trusting that the Su-
preme Court will find them as unfair and unworkable as Professor Ki-
dane and I do. 
 
